Worried, Richard phoned a precinct house in Philadelphia. An officer there promised to call Richard if he heard anything. At around 6 a.m., the phone awoke Richard. Emergency medical workers had found Justin’s body, identified by his dress whites and name tag. Richard promised to notify his brother and his sister-in-law, and set down the receiver.
“I don’t often shed tears,” Richard recalled, “and so I measure my sadness by the size of the lump in my throat. I’m going to tell you right now, ever since I got that phone call, this damn lump has not stopped growing.”
Georgetta Gregory, the head of the N.T.S.B.’s railroad division, grew up in Arkansas, the daughter of a lifelong rail man. In 1974, at 19, she followed in her father’s footsteps and took her first railroad job; at 30, she became a dispatcher at Southern Pacific. There were few other women in the business then, but Gregory had grit and drive. She moved a lot: California, Colorado, then Georgia, where she was employed for three years at Marta, Atlanta’s municipal rail service.
It was in California that she oversaw her first cleanup after a derailment. “One thing you understand immediately is the phenomenal forces that take place during a railroad accident,” she said recently. “This is extremely large equipment, and it’s whipped around like empty matchboxes. I remember not being scared,” she went on, “but more in awe. Like, this is something to be respected.” Trains moved very quickly, she learned, until they didn’t. Unlike a capsized ship taking on water or a goose-struck airliner gliding to earth, trains almost always wrecked with awesome violence, loudly and fast.
Late on the evening of May 12, Gregory got word from an Amtrak contact about a massive derailment in Frankford Junction. It was too late to book a flight from Washington, so she and three investigators car-pooled to the crash site, arriving at the Conrail yard, on the southeast side of Frankford Junction, at 4 in the morning. The air was acrid with smoke, and through the trees, Gregory saw the flicker of the lights from the Philadelphia Fire Department trucks and ambulances. News helicopters thumped above the crash site.
The wreck appeared in segments: It was sprawled over too much ground to take in at once. The locomotive had detached from the rest of the train and shot 50 yards or so in an easterly direction, down a short embankment, before coming to a halt, its wheels mired deep in the wet dirt. Coaches 7, 6 and 5 were still upright. But Cars 4, 3 and 2 were overturned, and Car 1 — the business-class car — was so bent and crumpled as to be unrecognizable as a car at all.
In the harsh glare of the temporary light fixtures, hundreds of emergency medical workers were at work, escorting those who could walk to waiting police and E.M.T. vehicles and helping to carry those who could not. By dawn, hundreds of survivors were safe in local hospitals, and a grimmer phase of the recovery was underway. The names of the dead scrolled down TV screens across the country: Laura Finamore, Jim Gaines, Abid Gilani, Derrick Griffith, Rachel Jacobs, Giuseppe Piras. A day later, cadaver dogs found the remains of Robert Gildersleeve, a 45-year-old Maryland businessman, in the business-class car.
N.T.S.B. rail investigators are trained to minimize the amount of time they need on scene, so the process of debris removal and track repair can begin as quickly as possible — every day that a company can’t run trains on that track is considered to be a day squandered. Gregory and her team set about taking measurements of the cars and their trajectories and red-tagging any evidence, which would be transported to N.T.S.B. or Amtrak facilities for cataloging and three-dimensional scanning.
“It’s important to move fast, but it’s important to do some of the interviews, with the crew and passengers, when it’s fresh in their minds,” Gregory said. “And above all, you want to make sure you’ve got all the evidence that you’re going to need, that there’s nothing you’ve overlooked.”
After four days in Philadelphia, she returned to Washington, where the second — and more difficult — part of the investigation would begin.
Amtrak 188 was not the deadliest crash in company history: In 1993, 47 people died when the Miami-bound Sunset Limited careened off a bridge spanning a tributary of the Mobile River in Alabama. But that accident was quickly attributed to a barge strike that had misaligned the tracks. Most rail wrecks are that way: The cause is either obvious to investigators from the get-go or becomes obvious over the course of weeks — a collision with another train, a malfunctioning engine, a car stuck on the tracks. The fate of 188, by contrast, appeared to be a genuine mystery. There was no obvious cause, no readily apparent smoking gun.
At N.T.S.B. headquarters, a team of close to 20 investigators was convened. They broke into working groups, each of which was assigned an area to examine based on the expertise of its members, typically former railroad engineers or technicians. Over the next few weeks and months, a winnowing process occurred. Faulty signal boxes were dismissed as a possible contributing factor, as were track anomalies and major problems with the locomotive: Data from the black box showed the engine was working perfectly well right up to the moment of derailment.
Computer glitches have also been ruled out. On train message boards of the kind Bostian once frequented, some contributors linked to a report, published on the website of Trains magazine, concerning possible “screen freezes” on the ACS-64’s digital displays. Amtrak has said in a statement that it looked into the issue and found “no further reports of this occurring.”
Similarly, there was no collision with a train or an errant car or truck — 188 was definitely the only vehicle on the rails at Frankford Junction at 9:21 p.m. And although Bostian incurred a leg injury and a head wound requiring staples, his overall health was good. He consented to a blood test that proved he did not have drugs or alcohol in his system, and he gave the N.T.S.B. investigators his smartphone and permission to look over his phone records. Bostian seemed far too conscientious to have deliberately taken his attention from the controls — no one I spoke to, official or colleague, would give any credence to the proposition that the accident was intentional.
Last summer, in the second month of the inquiry, I visited Robert Hall, the N.T.S.B.’s director of railroad, pipeline and hazardous-material investigations, at his office in Washington’s L’Enfant Plaza. Hall, who was wearing a tie depicting a scene from the Bayeux Tapestry, looked fatigued — the N.T.S.B. had recently announced there was no evidence that Bostian had used his phone directly before 188 wrecked. This announcement hurled the accident, and with it Hall’s team, straight back into the center of the news cycle. (The N.T.S.B. did find that Bostian dialed 911 on his phone after the crash.)
“We’ll get to the bottom of it,” Hall said, yanking at his tie. “Because, look, I don’t subscribe to acts of God. In any system, you’ve got humans making decisions, and those decisions have implications. I suppose you could decide not to design for something, and that omission ends up being the cause. Either way,” he continued, “human error is involved.”
In the first week of February, the N.T.S.B. will release the “docket” from the 188 investigation — a voluminous preliminary report comprising raw data from the train’s black box, imagery from the site and notes from investigators. Its ruling on the probable cause of the accident will most likely come this spring. Until then, the N.T.S.B. has declined to discuss its findings publicly. Still, in discussions with a range of rail officials — many of whom, citing the N.T.S.B. inquiry, declined to speak on the record — it appears clear that in the eyes of the N.T.S.B., the key to the wreck is something investigators call “lost situational awareness.”
There are two main schools of thought on what may have caused Bostian to lose his bearings. The first takes into account the rockings in the vicinity and Bostian’s own reported account of his train being struck by a large object, his forehead wounds and a small pocked dent on the left side of the windshield — a dent of the kind typically produced by a rock. “To me, it’s pretty clear what happened,” Richard Beall, the longtime accident investigator, told me. “Bostian’s got the throttle open to get the train up to speed. A projectile hits the windshield. Now the windshields on these locomotives are thick, but that impact is going to be out of nowhere and scary. As a human, you’ve got a tendency to duck. But he ducks into the dashboard and smacks his head, knocks himself out. And by the time he’s back up, and he’s reoriented himself, it’s: ‘Oh, crap.’ ”
Of course, other engineers, struck by projectiles in exactly the same place on the Northeast Corridor, managed to keep their trains from overturning — a point that Beall willingly concedes. “It happens, it’s violent and terrifying, but you move on,” he told me. Which brings up the second, and not mutually exclusive, possibility. This situation takes place in the same time frame but has Bostian lost, confusing Frankford Junction with the curve before it and realizing his mistake only at the last moment. Several people involved in the investigation offered the analogy of a driver on a long and darkened freeway, mesmerized by the unending roll of asphalt. A kind of hypnosis takes over. The driver, fatigued, looks up to see his exit, but it’s already starting to pass, and the car swerves off the road at a dangerous speed. If Bostian had been rocked earlier in the trip, they said, this might have only added to his confusion, putting him on edge.
It’s easy to see: a rattled young engineer finishing the second leg of a frustrating couplet, aboard a racehorse of a high-powered locomotive he was still growing accustomed to. A notoriously tricky piece of track. And a moment of distraction at precisely the worst time.
Perhaps the most tragic aspect of the wreck of 188 is that it could have been avoided, or at least mitigated, had the right safeguard — positive train control — been in place. Renewed pressure has been brought to bear on the industry by P.T.C. advocates like Robert Sumwalt of the N.T.S.B. and Sarah Feinberg of the Federal Railroad Administration. (The agencies have been pushing for the technology for decades.) “My hope,” Feinberg told me recently, “is that the derailment was our long-overdue wake-up call that we need P.T.C. — that we owe it to passengers and rail staff to have it online.”
In late May, Joseph Boardman, Amtrak’s C.E.O. and president, promised that the installation of P.T.C. on the Northeast Corridor would be completed by the end of 2015, a pledge he has kept: Today, the system is active on all routes, with the exception of substantial stretches of track owned by the State of Connecticut. (A spokesman for the Connecticut Department of Transportation said it hoped to have P.T.C. installed on all state-owned track by 2018.)
It will be some time before a national rollout is complete. In November, President Obama signed into law an extension to the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, giving railroad companies — which had complained about the cost of implementation — until 2020 to bring the technology online. On sections of rail not protected by P.T.C., “there is absolutely nothing to prevent what happened to Amtrak 188 from happening again,” Richard Beall told me. “Nothing.”
For many survivors of the accident, and for the families of the dead, the public discussion about safety technology has come too late. “I spend my days thinking about how this could have happened,” Howard Zemser told me when I spoke to him by phone earlier this year. “But look, Justin was never lost like other young men are — he had this incredible focus. He didn’t need to count on other people. He counted on himself and his own strength. He would want us to do the same thing.”
In September, Howard and Susan filed their lawsuit against Amtrak, asking for a jury trial and claiming that the company’s “negligent, careless, reckless” actions led to Justin’s death. They are not alone: Dozens of other families and individuals, including the conductor onboard 188, Emilio Fonseca, are suing Amtrak, which said in July that it will not fight claims for compensatory damages. (Congress has capped the amount of money Amtrak can pay out in any single accident at $295 million.)
Survivors, meanwhile, are relying on time to help the memory of the crash fade. Last June, Seyward Darby and Corey Sobel were married in an outdoor ceremony. “I’m so happy to be alive and here with you,” Darby said in her vows. On a recent trip to Europe, she rode a train again for the first time. But reminders of the crash are everywhere. Before the wedding, a large cardboard box arrived at Darby and Sobel’s apartment in Park Slope. Inside was Darby’s computer bag, which was recovered from the wreckage at Frankford Junction. “When I ripped the tape off and opened the flaps, the smell was immediately recognizable and upsetting,” Darby told me. “Like dirt, and metal, everything the train had smelled like after we derailed.” She stuffed the bag into the back of her closet and hasn’t used it since.
Investigators have zeroed in on the cause of the accident, but they may never fully comprehend Bostian’s state of mind on May 12. This is the last real mystery of the wreck of Amtrak 188 — a mystery only Bostian can help solve. And for now, he isn’t talking publicly: He did not answer multiple requests for comment, by phone and by email. He remains on unpaid administrative leave as he prepares for the year ahead.
If the N.T.S.B. finds him directly responsible for the derailment, he could be hit with criminal charges ranging from reckless endangerment to manslaughter. There is precedent: In the late 1980s, a Conrail engineer pleaded guilty to “recklessly causing the deaths of 16 people” after he ran a signal and collided with an Amtrak coach headed to Philadelphia.
Even if Bostian is wholly cleared by the N.T.S.B. and found not to have been negligent in his actions on May 12, it is very unlikely he’ll ever pilot a train again. This alone would be harsh punishment for a man who grew up wanting to do nothing else. His role in the accident — and the inaction that could have prevented it — continue to haunt those who know him best. “When I heard about the accident,” a college friend of Bostian’s told me, “my first thought was, I wish Brandon was driving that train, because it never would have crashed.”Continue reading the main story
An article on Jan. 31 about the derailment of Amtrak 188 referred incorrectly to the ownership of the Amtrak network. Amtrak operates on more than 21,300 miles of routes, but does not own that entire network. The article also referred incorrectly to the length of Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor. It is 456 miles, not 225 miles.
Here are detailed file-by-file descriptions of the contents of specific fonds and/or links to scanned documents.
Locomotive Engineers' ball, Calgary, 1914
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers constitution. - 1913-1981. - 5 cm of textual records. - The series consists of the Constitution and By-laws of the Grand International Division (later, International Division) of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, and manuals for ritual and funeral service
|M-8687-1||Joint agreement between the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen adopted at a conference held in Chicago May 5-17, 1913 : and changes and amendments in the constitution and statutes of the B. of L.E. - .|
|M-8687-2||Constitution and by-laws of the Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. - 1933-1956. - Consists of 1933, 1947, 1930, 1956 revisions.|
|M-8687-3||Constitution and bylaws of the International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. - 1981.|
|M-8687-4||Ritual of the Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers : comprising form of opening and closing of Divisions, balloting, draping of Division charter, and memorial service ; form of initiation and installation of officers, instructions for nominations, elections and trials : together with the resolutions adopted at the triennial and special sessions of the Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers ; Funeral ceremony : B. of L.E. service for the grave, service for house or church. - 1950, 1956.|
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Minutes. - 1911-1947. - 10 cm of textual records. - The series consists of minutes of the General Committee of Adjustment (for all Canadian Pacific lines in Canada); the General Committee of Adjustment, Canadian Pacific Railway, Western Lines; the General Committee of Adjustment, Canadian Pacific Railway, Eastern Lines; and joint committees of the B. of L.E. and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen in the Canadian Pacific Western Lines. Meetings of the General Committees of Adjustment were held triennially, and some years are missing from the series.
|M-8687-5||General Committee of Adjustment, Canadian Pacific Railway : minutes. - 1915-1930.|
|M-8687-6||General Committee of Adjustment, Canadian Pacific Railway : minutes. - 1932-1947.|
|M-8687-7||General Committee of Adjustment, Canadian Pacific Railway, Western Lines : minutes. - 1911|
|M-8687-8||General Committee of Adjustment, Canadian Pacific Railway, Western Lines : minutes. - 1915-1929.|
|M-8687-9||General Committee of Adjustment, Canadian Pacific Railway, Eastern Lines : minutes. - 1917-1928.|
|M-8687-10||Minutes of joint meeting of General Committee of Adjustment, B. of L.E and Joint Protective Board, B. of L. F. & E., Western Lines, Canadian Pacific Railway. - 1915-1916.|
|M-8687-11||Minutes of joint meeting of the General Committee of Adjustment of the B. of L.E and General Grievance Committee of the B. of L.F. & E., representing Western Lines of the Canadian Pacific Railway. - 1917-1920.|
|M-8687-12||Minutes of Joint Schedule Committee, B. of L.E. and B. of L.F & E., Western Lines, C.P.Ry. - 1918.|
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General Committee of Adjustment quarterly reports. - 1913-1954. - 27 cm of textual records. - The reports consist largely of day-to-day logs of the meetings and other activities of the General Chairman of the General Committee of Adjustment. A few reports are accompanied by more detailed reports on discussions with Management on particular issues. For 1950-1954 the reports cover the Western Lines only.
|M-8687-13||Index to quarterly reports, 1913-1918. - .|
|M-8687-14||Quarterly reports. - 1913. - Includes report and letter concerning standards of eyesight required for locomotive engineers.|
|M-8687-15||Quarterly reports. - 1914.|
|M-8687-16||Quarterly reports. - 1915.|
|M-8687-17||Quarterly reports. - 1916.|
|M-8687-18||Quarterly reports. - 1917.|
|M-8687-19||Quarterly reports. - 1918.|
|M-8687-20||Quarterly reports. - 1919.|
|M-8687-21||Quarterly reports. - 1920.|
|M-8687-22||Quarterly reports. - 1921.|
|M-8687-23||Quarterly reports. - 1922.|
|M-8687-24||Quarterly reports. - 1923.|
|M-8687-25||Quarterly reports. - 1924.|
|M-8687-26||Quarterly reports. - 1925.|
|M-8687-27||Quarterly reports. - 1926.|
|M-8687-28||Quarterly reports. - 1927-1928.|
|M-8687-29||Quarterly reports. - 1929.|
|M-8687-30||Quarterly reports. - 1930.|
|M-8687-31||Quarterly reports. - 1931.|
|M-8687-32||Quarterly reports. - 1932.|
|M-8687-33||Quarterly reports. - 1933.|
|M-8687-34||Quarterly reports. - 1934.|
|M-8687-35||Quarterly reports. - 1935.|
|M-8687-36||Quarterly reports. - 1936.|
|M-8687-37||Quarterly reports. - 1937.|
|M-8687-38||Quarterly reports. - 1938.|
|M-8687-39||Quarterly reports. - 1939.|
|M-8687-40||Quarterly reports. - 1940.|
|M-8687-41||Quarterly reports. - 1941.|
|M-8687-42||Quarterly reports. - 1942.|
|M-8687-43||Quarterly reports. - 1943.|
|M-8687-44||Quarterly reports. - 1944.|
|M-8687-45||Quarterly reports. - 1945.|
|M-8687-46||Quarterly reports. - 1946.|
|M-8687-47||Quarterly reports. - 1947.|
|M-8687-48||Quarterly reports. - 1948.|
|M-8687-49||Quarterly reports. - 1949.|
|M-8687-50||Quarterly reports. - 1950.|
|M-8687-51||Quarterly reports. - 1951|
|M-8687-52||Quarterly reports. - 1952.|
|M-8687-53||Quarterly reports. - 1953.|
|M-8687-54||Quarterly reports. - 1954.|
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General Committee of Adjustment circulars. - 1942-1972. - 22 cm of textual records. - The series consists of circular letters from the General Chairman of the General Committee of Adjustment to the membership. The circulars concern labour relations, working conditions, and internal union matters. The 1942-1947 circulars are arranged according to a numbering system and indexed. The 1953-1972 circulars are arranged according to a new numbering system.
|M-8687-55||Index of circulars 1-13. - [1945?].|
|M-8687-56||Circulars 1-6. - 1942-1945.|
|M-8687-57||Circulars 7-13. - 1942-1945.|
|M-8687-58||Index of circulars 14-38. - 1947?].|
|M-8687-59||Circulars 14-20. - 1942-1946.|
|M-8687-60||Circulars 21-25. - 1942-1946.|
|M-8687-61||Circulars 26-30. - 1942-1947.|
|M-8687-62||Circulars 31-38. - 1942-1946.|
|M-8687-63||Contents of circulars 39-65. -[1947?]|
|M-8687-64||Circulars 39-45. - 1942-1945.|
|M-8687-65||Circulars 46-50. - 1942-1947.|
|M-8687-66||Circulars 51-55. - 1942-1944.|
|M-8687-67||Circulars 56-60. - 1943-1944.|
|M-8687-68||Circulars 61-65. - 1943-1944.|
|M-8687-69||Circulars. - 1948.|
|M-8687-70||Circulars. - 1949.|
|M-8687-71||Circulars. - 1950.|
|M-8687-72||Circulars. - 1951-1953.|
|M-8687-73||Circulars 1-24. - 1953-1954.|
|M-8687-74||Circulars 25-59. - 1955.|
|M-8687-75||Circulars 60-67. - 1956.|
|M-8687-76||Circulars 68-92. - 1957.|
|M-8687-77||Circulars 93-104. - 1958.|
|M-8687-78||Circulars 105-116. - 1959.|
|M-8687-79||Circulars 117-128. - 1960.|
|M-8687-80||Circulars 129-140. - 1961.|
|M-8687-81||Circulars 141-162. - 1962.|
|M-8687-82||Circulars 163-176. - 1963.|
|M-8687-83||Circulars 177-184. - 1964.|
|M-8687-84||Circulars 185-222. - 1965.|
|M-8687-85||Circulars 223-246. - 1966.|
|M-8687-86||Circulars 247-260. - 1967.|
|M-8687-87||Circulars 261-273. - 1968.|
|M-8687-88||Circulars 274-285. - 1969.|
|M-8687-89||Circulars 286-307. - 1970.|
|M-8687-90||Circulars 308-331. -1971.|
|M-8687-91||Circulars 332-355. - 1972.|
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Collective agreements. - 1901-1990. - 24 cm of textual records. - The series consists of collective agreements between the General Committee of Adjustment and the Canadian Pacific Railway. The earlier collective agreements were incorporated into the Rates of Pay and Rules issued by the Railway. Some of them include rates of pay and rules for firemen and hostlers. Also included are a few agreements between the B. of L.E. and the CNR, agreements between the United Transportation Union and the CPR, and two booklets describing benefit plans for CPR employees. - Some of the titles described in this series have been abridged.
|M-8687-92||CPR, Pacific Division : schedule of rates and rules for locomotive engineers and firemen. - 1901.|
|M-8687-93||CPR, Pacific Division : schedule of rates and rules for enginemen. - 1903.|
|M-8687-94||CPR, Pacific Division : rates of pay and rules governing service of engineers. - 1907.|
|M-8687-95||CPR, Pacific Division : rates of pay and rules governing service of firemen. - 1907.|
|M-8687-96||CPR, Western Lines, British Columbia Division : rates of pay and rules governing services of locomotive engineers. - 1911. - 2 printings.|
|M-8687-97||CPR, Western Division : schedule of rates and rules for enginemen. - 1903.|
|M-8687-98||CPR, Western Lines : rates of pay and rules governing services of locomotive engineers. - 1911. - And supplement, 1916.|
|M-8687-99||CPR, Western Lines : rates of pay and rules governing service of locomotive engineers, firemen, and hostlers. - 1917-1920.|
|M-8687-100||CPR, Western Lines : rates of pay and rules governing the service of engineers. - 1929. - Reprinted 1942.|
|M-8687-101||Collective agreement : CPR & B. of L.E., Prairie and Pacific Regions. - 1952, 1962.|
|M-8687-102||Collective agreement : CPR & B. of L.E., Prairie and Pacific Regions. - 1971, 1977.|
|M-8687-103||Collective agreement : Canadian Pacific Ltd. & B. of L.E., heavy haul systems, Thunder Bay and west. - 1989.|
|M-8687-104||CPR, Central Division : schedule of rates and rules for enginemen. - 1903.|
|M-8687-105||CPR, Eastern Lines : rates of pay and rules governing service of locomotive engineers. - 1917.|
|M-8687-106||CPR, Eastern Lines : rates of pay and rules governing service of locomotive engineers, firemen, and hostlers. - 1920.|
|M-8687-107||CPR, Eastern Lines : rates of pay and rules governing service of locomotive engineers. - 1927.|
|M-8687-108||CPR, Eastern Lines : rates of pay and rules governing service of locomotive engineers. - 1927. - Rev. and re-issued 1939.|
|M-8687-109||Collective agreement : CPR and B. of L.E., Eastern Region. - 1951, 1953.|
|M-8687-110||Collective agreement : CPR and B. of L.E., Atlantic and Eastern Regions : also applicable to Quebec Central Railway Company. - Reprinted 1965. - 2 copies with different covers.|
|M-8687-111||Collective agreements : Canadian Pacific Ltd. and United Transportation Union. - 1976, 1989.|
|M-8687-112||Canadian Pacific : Disability plan and life insurance ; Dental, extended health, and vision care plans. - 1989-1990.|
|M-8687-113||Memorandum of agreements and interpretations between CNR, Western Lines and its engineers. - 1930. - [Amended to 1945].|
|M-8687-114||CNR (Western Region) : rates of pay and rules governing locomotive engineers. - 1930. - Re-arranged and re-printed 1957.|
|M-8687-115||CNR, Atlantic and Central Regions : rates of pay and rules governing service of locomotive engineers. - 1929. - Reprinted 1951.|
|M-8687-116||CNR, Atlantic and Central regions : rates of pay and rules governing service of locomotive engineers. - 1929. - Reprinted 1957.|
|M-8687-117||Agreement 1.1 between CNR and B. of L.E. - 1978. - Amended 1979.|
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Canadian Railway Board of Adjustment No. 1 and Canadian Railway Office of Arbitration. - 1954-1969. - 8 cm of textual records. - The series consists of reports of Canadian government bodies whose function was to resolve labour disputes in the railway industry. Consists of triennial reports of the Canadian Railway Board of Adjustment No. 1 (1954-1963) and reports on individual cases heard by its successor, the Canadian Railway Office of Arbitration (1965-1969).
|M-8687-118||The Canadian Railway Board of Adjustment No. 1 : report of proceedings of Board. - 12th-15th. - 1954-1963. - Covers period 1951-1963.|
|M-8687-119||Canadian Railway Board of Arbitration : cases no. 1-48. - 1965-1966.|
|M-8687-120||Canadian Railway Board of Arbitration : cases no. 49-99. - 1967.|
|M-8687-121||Canadian Railway Board of Arbitration : cases no. 100-166. - 1968-1969.|
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Operating rules and manuals. - 1935-1990. - 21 cm of textual records. - The series consists of manuals issued to employees of the Canadian Pacific Railway containing rules for the safe operation of its rolling stock and equipment.
|M-8687-122||CPR : maintenance of way instructions. - 1935.|
|M-8687-123||CPR : air brake and air train signal rules. - 1937.|
|M-8687-124||CPR : questions covering mechanical examinations for locomotive engineers. - 1945.|
|M-8687-125||CPR : answers to questions covering mechanical examinations for locomotive engineers. - 1945.|
|M-8687-126||CPR : air and dynamic brake and air signal systems. - 1950.|
|M-8687-127||CPR : general instructions pertaining to the movement of trains, engines and cars. - 1958, 1962.|
|M-8687-128||CPR : train handling and other instructions relating to brake and communicating signal equipment. - 1959, 1975.|
|M-8687-129||CPR : mechanical examinations for enginemen. - 1959.|
|M-8687-130||CPR : rules for the operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of air brake and communicating signal equipment on motive power, cars, and work equipment. - 1959, 1971.|
|M-8687-131||Board of Transport Commissioners for Canada : uniform code of operating rules. - Revision. - 1962.|
|M-8687-132||CPR : code of safety rules and safe practices. - .|
|M-8687-133||GM, Electro-Motive Division : SD40-2 operator's manual. - 3rd ed. - 1963.|
|M-8687-134||CPR : haulage capacity, diesel-electric units. - 1980.|
|M-8687-135||CPR : remote locomotive operation and slow speed control. - Rev. - 1982.|
|M-8687-136||CPR : safety and accident prevention code. - 1983.|
|M-8687-137||CPR : train accident cause finding. - 1985.|
|M-8687-138||CPR : railway air brake minimum inspection, testing and operating standards. - 1986.|
|M-8687-139||CPR : railway protection of track units and maintenance work regulations. - 1988.|
|M-8687-140||CPR : air brakes and train handling. - 1988, 1989.|
|M-8687-141||Railway Association of Canada : Canadian rail operating rules. - 1990.|
|M-8687-142||CPR : general operating instructions : effective with CROR. - [1990?].|
|M-8687-143||CPR : safety and prevention rules. - 1990.|
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Unprocessed records. - [ca. 1940-2005]. - This material has not been processed. Please consult with an Archivist before requesting.
|M-9047||Collective agreements. [accession 2004.101]|
|M-9197||Correspondence and office records. - [ca. 1940-1990]. - 2.7 m of textual records [accession 2006.117]|
|M-9282||Collective agreements and operating manuals for union members of the two predecessors of Teamsters Canada Rail Conference, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the United Transportation Union. - [ca. 1970-2005]. - 20 cm of textual records. [accession 2008.064]|
|M-9339||Correspondence and office records. - [ca. 1950-1997]. - 1.5 m of textual records [accession 2008.136]|